Secret sharing is an efficient method for transmitting the image securely. This paper proposes an efficient secret sharing scheme for secret image. The protocol allows each participant to share a secret gray image with the rest of participants. In our scheme, a secret digital image is divided into n pieces, which are further distributed into n participants. The secret digital image can be reconstructed if and only if r or more legal participants cooperate together. These schemes have no pixel expansion. It is general in nature and can be applied on any image size. The proposed scheme is based on the chaotic map and the Chinese Remainder theorem. The security of the scheme is analyzed and the protocol is proven to be secure and be able to resist statistic and exhaustive attacks.
Introduction
With the rapid development of network technology, image information can be distributed and transformed on the internet rapidly and conveniently; image security becomes more and more important. Image security includes Image Hiding, Digital Watermarking and Digital Image Sharing. Due to the characteristic of image, many researchers devote to study on Image Encryption and digital Watermarking, so there are many novel research papers published. 6, 7, 9, 11, 19 Secret image sharing is just recently discovered.
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Secret image sharing is an important subject of digital image information security. It is based on secret sharing schemes. Recently, the secret image sharing has become a key technology to keep confidentiality in the field of information security and protection. However, there is an important issue that such techniques should deal with accidental or intentional loss/corruption of images when a single party accesses to the data. If the secret image is always protected by only one person, it will be easy to be lost, destroyed, or modified by attacker.
Image sharing which protects and distributes a secret image among a group of participants provides solutions to this issue. Blakley 3 and Shamir 15 firstly proposed a concept, named (r, n)-threshold scheme, to solve this problem independently. A (r, n)-threshold scheme consists of a trusted dealer and n participants. The dealer divides the secret document into n shadows and distributes them to n participants. The secret document cannot be reconstructed unless some specific groups of more than r − 1 out of n shadow holders pool their shadows. Usually a (r, n) threshold scheme has three features: (1) the secret is divided into n shadows; (2) any r or more shadows can be used to reconstruct the secret; (3) any r − 1 or fewer shadows reveal no knowledge about the secret. Recently, several cryptographic protocols for (r, n)-threshold cryptography have been proposed in Refs. 5 and 21. A (r, n)-threshold scheme is called ideal if the size of every share is equal to the size of the shared secret, and a (r, n)-threshold scheme is said to be perfect if the knowledge of any r − 1 or fewer shares provides no information about the original secret in Refs. 17 and 18. Numerous secret sharing schemes have been proposed in the past decades. The first (r, n)-threshold scheme presented to share secret images was credited to Naor and Shamir 13 and is called the visual cryptography. It is based on visual threshold schemes r of n, i.e. the secret image is divided into n shares in such a way that each of them is photocopied in a transparency and then, the original image is recovered by superimposing any r transparencies but no less. However, this scheme is perfect but not ideal. This is because the size of the shared images is bigger than the original one. After that, Chang and Hwang 4 introduced the codebook idea into the image sharing. Logical operations 10, [24] [25] [26] are the common methods to achieve (r, n)-
threshold. An elegant method 10 was given to prevent hackers from seeing secret images; however, the disadvantage of this method is that each (gray or color) shadow is several times bigger than the original image. It is well-known that the secret sharing is a reliable method for cryptographic key protection, and has many valuable properties. For example, it is a perfect threshold scheme, in which the size of each share does not exceed the size of the secret, and the security does not rely on unproven mathematical assumptions. To maintain these advantages, Thien and Lin changed the values of polynomial coefficients a j into a corresponding pixel value of a secret image. According to their design, the size of the shares is very small, and their security has also been analyzed, but the recovery image is lost if the pixel value of the secret image exceeds 251 in Thien and Lin's scheme. 20 To overcome the information loss problem, without extra overhead, Yang et al. 26 modified the field to Galois field in mod two 8 to obtain lossless recovery of a secret image; however, this approach not only reduces the quality of the stego images but also allows a significant probability that the fake stego image can be authenticated successfully. The characteristics of the chaotic maps have attracted the attention of cryptographers to develop new encryption algorithms. As chaotic maps have many fundamental properties such as ergodicity, mixing property and sensitivity to initial condition/system parameter, which can be considered analogous to some cryptographic properties of ideal ciphers such as confusion, diffusion, balance and avalanche property and so on in Ref. 8 . Moreover we will introduce the chaotic map into the secret image sharing.
In this paper, our aim is to design a secure threshold (r, n)-secret image sharing scheme based on logistic map and CRT. The advantage of our scheme is provided with fault tolerance, ideal and perfect according to the criterion in Refs. 17 and 18.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: preliminaries knowledge is given in Sec. 2. In Sec. 3, our threshold secret image sharing scheme based on chaotic map and CRT is proposed and gives the experimental results of our scheme in Sec. 4, and then analyze the security of the scheme in Sec. 5. Finally, some conclusions of are presented in Sec. 6.
Preliminaries
In this section, we will introduce Asmuth-Bloom scheme, logistic map and CRT.
Asmuth-Bloom scheme
In Ref. 2, Charles Asmuth and John Bloom introduced a key safeguarding scheme; which was called Asmuth-Bloom scheme. In this scheme, named a (r, n)-threshold scheme, we always choose a large prime number p. Then, a set of integers p, m 1 < m 2 < · · · < m n is chosen subject to the following conditions:
Here, as before, n denotes the number of shadows. Any r shadows will suffice for key recovery. Estimates of the density of primes had been also shown that one could easily find primes m i to satisfy (ii). To find composite is still easier. Finally,
The decomposition process begins with the key x; we assume that 0 < x < p, and let
where A is an arbitrary integer subject to the condition 0 ≤ Y < M. Then the shadows y i :
To recover x, it clearly suffices to find Y , if r shadows or more shadows are known, then by the CRT, we can recover the Y , or else, it cannot recover the Y .
Chinese Remainder theorem
The Chinese Remainder theorem (CRT) is an important theory in number theory, and plays an important role in cryptography. 
. . . 
Proof.
. . , n, we note that M i and m i are coprime, so there exists a unique inverse element 
From Theorem 2.1, if the fixed r, 1 < r < n, then min(r) = r i=1 m i and max(r − 1) = n i=n−r+2 m i , we choose x, which is a positive integer and max(r − 1) < x < min(r). Let a i denote the remainder of x modulo m i for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, the set a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a n is the (r, n)-threshold scheme of x, which is called Asmuth-Bloom scheme.
For example: r = 2, m 1 = 15, m 2 = 19 and m 3 = 23, we denote x = 93, 93 ∈ (23, 285), a (2, 3)-threshold, the algorithm can be described as follows:
Step 4. Assume that we know m 1 , m 2 , a 1 and
; then x = 3798 mod 285 = 93. So the x can be recovered when r > 2.
Chaotic logistic map
In this section, we introduce a chaotic map. The chaotic system which is deterministic has a noise-like behavior, if we give its parameters and initial values, we can reproduce it. These signals are extremely sensitive to initial conditions.
Theorem 2.2. One of the most famous chaotic systems is logistic map, which is a nonlinear map given by
where λ ∈ (0, 4), X n ∈ [0, 1]. When 3.5699 . . . < λ < 4, the system is Chaotic. Figure 1 shows the plot of x(n) under n for X 0 = 0.618 and λ = 3.98 after 700 iterations.
The Proposed Scheme
In this section, we describe a kind of image sharing algorithm based on logistic map and CRT.
Shares construction procedure
The share construction procedure requires two phases to divide a secret image into n shadows as shown in Fig. 2 
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S m
Prime q j (1≤j≤m) where the symbol · is the floor function meaning "the greatest integer less than or equal to". This phase modifies the pixel, and ensures the security of the images.
Phase 2: Constructing the process by CRT Because our encoding process is essentially based on logistic map and CRT, we choose a set of m relatively prime module q 1 < q 2 < s < q m in this phase, then
In order to ensure the (t, m)-threshold property in the Asmuth-Bloom's scheme, we adjust a ij to a ij such that β < a ij < α, a ij by adding an offset p, where β < p < α − 2 1 6. a ij is transformed into a ij as follows:
the a ij is within the range of (β, α) so as to be shared in a (t, m) manner by CRT. The encoding scheme is formally described as follows:
Output: shadow S j , e j , and q j for 1 ≤ j ≤ m.
Step 1. The original image A is processed by logistic map by Eqs. (3.1) and (3.2), and then we get the a ij ;
Step 4. Choose p(β < p < α − 2 16 ), the a ij is converted a ij by using (10);
Step 5.
Step 6.
Step 7. Output (S 1 , S 2 , . . . , S m ; e 1 , e 2 , . . . , e m ; q 1 , q 2 , . . . , q m ) .
Note that the original image A is distributed into S 1 , S 2 , . . . , S m , and the p is decomposed as e j according to q j by CRT. Furthermore, we can distribute q j and e j to the participators as the key of the original image, then S j as shadows to participant j for 1 ≤ j ≤ m.
Recover procedure
The proposed scheme is a (r, m)-threshold scheme, so at least any t(r ≤ t ≤ m) of m shadows must be collected separately in advance to restore the secret image. Figure 3 shows the flowchart of our proposed recover procedure. 
S m
Prime q j (r≤t≤m) 
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The dealer uses t collected shadows to reconstruct image A by CRT. 
Experimental Results
We demonstrate the feasibility and applicability of our image sharing scheme by showing the experimental results of sharing a gray image in the (3, 4)-threshold. The experimental image A is chosen as 512 × 512 gray Lena image, as shown in Fig. 3 . We choose (q 1 , q 2 , q 3 , q 4 ) = (241, 247, 251, 253). Then α = q 1 × q 2 × q 3 = 14941277 and β = 63503. We choose p = 64221. Our scheme is coded in Matlab 7.0 running in a PC Windows environment. Figure 4 shows the encoding results of the four shadows with respect to image Lena. Here Figs. 4(b)-4(e) are the shadows of the image Lena respectively. These shadows which are distributed to the four participants are all seemingly random images. The size of each of the four shadows is 512 × 512. We display each of the shadows as a 512 × 512 image. p = 64221 is also shared among the four participants by CRT. We obtain (e 1 , e 2 , e 3 , e 4 ) = (115, 236, 216, 212). A set of participants can reconstruct number p and image Lena by using logistic map and CRT with their keys and shadows only when separately t ≥ 3. The experimental result is shown in Fig. 5 . Any group of three shadows of S 1 , S 2 , S 3 , S 4 or more than three shadows can recover the original image Lena.
From Table 1 , we may see that the proposed method has lossless and fault tolerance properties. In Fig. 5, it shows that the size of every shadow image is equal to the size of the original image Lena, and the knowledge of any three or fewer shadow images provides no information about the original image, and then, the scheme is ideal and perfect according to the criterion given in Refs. 17 and 18.
Security Analysis
In this section, we analyze the security of the scheme. Specifically, we will analyze its resistance of the most important attacks. We propose such a method that secret image can be shared by several shadow images. The size of each shadow image is the same as the secret image in our method, and it gives our method certain benefits, such easier process for storage, transmission, and hiding. The size of shadow images are no expansion by comparing with the original image Lena. 
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(a) {S 1 , S 2 , S 3 } (b) {S 1 , S 2 , S 4 } (c) {S 1 , S 3 , S 4 } (d) {S 2 , S 3 , S 4 } (e) {S 1 , S 2 , S 3 , S 4 }
Statistical analysis
The statistical test tries to determine the confusion and diffusion properties of the proposed scheme. This test is performed by a correlation test of adjacent pixels of the original image and its shadows. The correlation test between adjacent pixels in the images has been made by selecting in a random way 2500 pairs of two vertically adjacent pixels, 2500 pairs of two horizontally adjacent pixels, and 2500 pairs of two diagonally adjacent pixels, for each original image as well as its shadows. In each case, the correlation coefficient of each pair has been computed and the results are shown in Table 2 . As is well-known, the correlation coefficient is defined by the following expression
where x and y are the value of two adjacent pixels in the image and N is total number of pixels selected from the image for the calculation.
As it is shown in Table 2 , the correlation coefficients are far apart. For example, in the original image, the correlation coefficient for two horizontally adjacent pixels is 0.9778, which is very near to 1, as it was expected. Nevertheless, in the four shadows, these coefficients are 0.0075, 0.0029, 0.0038, and −0.0019, respectively, i.e. these are very close to 0. Similar results for vertical and diagonal pixels are obtained (see Table 2 ). It is observed that the correlation coefficients of the images and the shadows are different enough, which guarantee the confusion and diffusion of the pixels. In addition, the correlations in the shadows are very small indeed. Finally, Fig. 6 shows the correlation distribution of 2500 couples of horizontal adjacent pixels of the secret images and shadows, respectively. The correlation distributions of two vertically and diagonally adjacent pixels have the same appearance in Figs. 7 and 8. As it was expected, the adjacent pixels in the original image are distributed along the diagonal due to the fact that the gray levels of those pixels have a very near value. One can observe how in the first case, the distributions follow, approximately, the principal diagonal which gives an idea of the strong correlation among the pixels of the secret images; nevertheless, the distribution of the three classes of adjacent pixels for the shadows seems to be random. The clouds of points seem to distribute in a random way in Figs. 6-8, which indicates the weak correlation among the pixels of the shadows.
Security of the sharing scheme
The security of the sharing scheme is based on logistic map and CRT. In this method, the threshold is three, and then any two or fewer shadow images cannot get sufficient information to recover the secret image. Without loss of generality, consider a 512 × 512 image a is the pixel of the original image. Let us inspect how a can be recovered, an offset p is introduced into the scheme, the pixel a is modified through Eqs. (3.1) and (3.2). It is transformed into a , a = 256×X k ×a+p. From Eqs. (2.3) and (2.4), we need n prime numbers q to recover the a. If we only have two shadow images and fewer prime numbers q, we cannot recover the a , because the a is out of the range of ( m j=m−r+2 q j , r i=1 q i ). If a hacker wants to get all the information on the image by the exhaustive attack method, the possibility of obtaining the original image is only
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The p is 64221 in this scheme, and then we have 3), we found that the exhaustive attack method is infeasible. Also note that the original image has been shared by the logistic map before doing any sharing process; therefore, there is no correlation among the shadow images. In other words, although the neighboring pixels are usually similar, the lack of information cannot be supplied from the image property. Even if the hacker has 
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the information on the shadow image, it is only a part of the original images, and he cannot get all the information on the original image. Since (   1   129757 ) 262144 is a very small number, the hacker only has little chance to obtain a part of the shadow images, it is impossible to obtain the exact original image. Let us consider a more favorable case for the attacker. Suppose that the attacker knows r − 1 shadow images and the q i . In this situation, the attack cannot recover the original image by CRT. Figure 9 illustrates that any groups of two out of the four shadows image cannot recover the image Lena. Similarly, if the attacker has only a shadow image, he cannot get any information of the original image.
Conclusions
Based on logistic map and CRT, the secret image can be shared by several shadow images. The size of each shadow image has the same size of the secret image, and the knowledge of any r − 1 or fewer shares provides no information about the original image. The proposed scheme meets the requirements of the criterion given in Refs. 17 and 18, so the scheme is ideal and perfect. In addition, the proposed scheme has the ability of fault tolerance, which means although a part of the shadow images are lost, the original image can still be recovered if the quantity of the collected shadow images are equal to threshold r or more than r. On the other hand, the method is a lossless sharing method, and we can attain a lossless recovered image.
